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Introduction 
 
 
Asia-Pacific Free Trade Talks 
Nearing the Finish Line 
Setting the Agenda in the Struggle for Regional Markets,  
Multilateral Rules and Geopolitical Leadership 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
Asia is not only the world’s most dynamic region in terms of trade, it is also an im-
portant pacesetter in trade policy. The US is currently negotiating with eleven partner 
countries over a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the members of the ASEAN+6 group 
are in talks over a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); while Japan, 
China and Korea are conducting trilateral trade negotiations (CJK FTA). The multilateral 
structures emerging from all these initiatives could, in the long term, be combined into 
a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). What are the motives behind these agree-
ments? What are their chances of being implemented? When it comes to the trade and 
geopolitical power struggle that encompasses these talks, does the US or China have 
the upper hand? And what role remains for Europe’s trade policy? 
 
Asia’s trade policy landscape has funda-
mentally changed in the early 21st century. 
Whereas the defining trend up to the end 
of the 1990s was unilateral, non-discrimi-
natory liberalisation in line with the model 
of open regionalism, these days trade policy 
has swung towards discriminatory bilater-
alism: in 81 of the 263 bilateral free trade 
agreements currently registered with the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), at least 
one of the contract partners is a country in 
the Asia-Pacific. According to data from the 
Asian Development Bank there are another 
143 agreements currently under negotia-
tion. The attitude of the region’s decision-
makers towards multilateral trade policy 
has also changed: whereas the Asian and 
Pacific WTO members tried, at the time, to 
advance the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations with their own initia-
tives, there are no such initiatives in the 
current round of talks in Doha. By refusing 
to open up their agricultural markets, the 
heavy-weights China and India are even 
said to have contributed to the failure of 
the Doha Development Round. Meanwhile, 
current negotiations over the mega-deals 
TPP and RCEP are taking the regionalisation 
of trade policy into entirely new dimen-
sions. In each case there are several coun-
tries involved (see Fig. 1, p. 2) and the trade 
volumes are huge (see Fig. 2, p. 2). Further,  
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Figure 1 
Member states of the planned Asia-Pacific free trade zones 
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the content of the agreements goes beyond 
tariff liberalisation of traded goods and deep-
ly impacts the prospective signatory states’ 
sovereignty of economic policy, in areas 
including investment law, freedom of estab-
lishment, competition, regulation of ser-
vices, government procurement and intel-
lectual property rights. Since the WTO is 
not continuing to develop the international 
trade rules in these areas multilaterally, 
the agreements, if signed, would also set 
the tone in terms of regulatory policy: they 
would significantly influence how global 
trade rules are shaped in the future. 
Figure 2 
Weight of TPP, RCEP and CJK in the global 
economy, 2012 (proportion in %) 
 
TPP RCEP CJK 
Global populations 11.2 47.8  21.5 
Global production 37.1 28.6  20.6 
Global trade 26.2 28.9  18.2 
Of which intra-trade 11.3 12.3  3.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
The geopolitical dimension 
The present negotiations are not only sig-
nificant in terms of trade and regulatory 
policy. The establishment of trans-continent-
al free trade zones also has a geopolitical 
dimension. The TPP and RCEP negotiations 
are a reflection of the strategic rivalry be-
tween the United States and China. 
For the US, TPP is a key element of its 
“Pivot to Asia” strategy. By granting them 
preferential market access, the TPP aims 
to strengthen the Pacific states’ ties to the 
US and counter the pull of the Chinese mar-
ket. The TPP would create a trans-regional 
alliance of states with agreement on free 
internal trade and high regulatory stand-
ards. In principal China has the option of 
joining the TPP as it is a Pacific Rim country 
and an APEC member. However, it would 
then have to accept the previously nego-
tiated regulations and, further still, accept 
what are more or less arbitrary special con-
ditions. In China the TPP is therefore per-
ceived as part of the US strategy to contain 
China. 
An important component of China’s 
counter-strategy is the regional trade part-
nership RCEP, even though this is a diplo-
matic initiative of the ASEAN community. 
An RCEP free trade zone would constitute a 
regionally limited trade policy zone where 
China, thanks to its political and economic 
weight, could take the driving seat. The US 
would almost certainly be permanently 
excluded from this zone, as an existing free 
trade agreement with the ASEAN commu-
nity is a prerequisite for membership. China 
is also seeking bilateral free trade agree-
ments with its neighbouring countries, 
having already struck such agreements 
with ASEAN in 2005, New Zealand in 2008 
and most recently with South Korea and 
Australia. China is also conducting talks 
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over a trilateral agreement with Japan and 
South Korea. 
The fact that trade policy is charged with 
geopolitical significance makes it harder 
to find and settle on compromises in nego-
tiations, because the “win-win” situations 
intrinsic to trade policy tend to become 
zero-sum games of political power. Yet the 
main content of the TPP, RCEP and CJK 
negotiations revolves around removing 
tariffs and other barriers to trade. The par-
ticipating countries have primarily eco-
nomic motives. The current negotiations 
are determined by economic cost-benefit 
calculations and the domestic policies of 
the countries at the table. 
The window of opportunity for TPP 
is closing 
The negotiations over a TPP free trade 
agreement date back to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership agreement (TPP), signed by 
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore 
(P4) in 2005. At the APEC summit in 2009 
the US, Australia and Peru declared their 
intention to enter into negotiations with 
the four founding nations and to join the 
TPP agreement upon the successful con-
clusion of these talks. Having hesitated 
initially, Malaysia, Vietnam (2010), Canada, 
Mexico (2012) and Japan (2013) started 
participating in the negotiations as well. 
Aside from granting tariff preferences and 
establishing rules of origin, the 29 chapters 
being worked out in the TPP talks aim to 
set down binding “WTO-plus” rules, which 
cover services, investment protection, right 
of establishment, sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures, technical barriers to trade, 
rules of competition for state-owned com-
panies, government procurement, intel-
lectual property rights, labour and environ-
mental standards. However, neither the 
negotiations nor the envisaged TPP agree-
ment are truly multilateral. The US insisted 
on bilateral negotiations with those coun-
tries with which it had not previously signed 
a free trade agreement (Brunei, New Zea-
land, Malaysia, Vietnam, Japan). As a result, 
the TPP member states will continue to 
face different trade barriers when export-
ing goods to the US in the future. 
Nevertheless, for the twelve participating 
countries the agreement of such an exten-
sive trans-Pacific liberalisation agreement 
is an attractive and far-sighted venture for 
several reasons. 
First, the TPP promises higher employ-
ment, income and economic output. 
According to calculations by the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics in 
Washington, the seven initiators alone 
(P4 + US, Australia, Peru) could attain 
around USD 200bn higher export revenues 
and around USD 130bn higher income by 
2025. Gross domestic product (GDP) would 
increase by 0.38 percent in the US and by 
as much as 2.25 percent in New Zealand. 
Second, for the small and medium-sized 
TPP countries, receiving preferential mar-
ket access to the major economies of the 
US, Japan and Canada is an attractive pros-
pect, and this goes some way to stabilising 
investment expectations. 
Third, the multi-state approach of the TPP 
provides those countries that specialise in 
industrial production (Malaysia, Mexico, Viet-
nam) with opportunities to develop cross-
border supply and production chains; be-
cause intermediate goods from outside of 
the TPP are recognised as TPP value added 
when exported. The trading entrepot Singa-
pore could therefore cement its leading 
position as an international trade and logis-
tics hub. 
Fourth, as a “platinum-standard” agree-
ment with binding requirements and legal-
ly enforceable norms, the TPP agreement 
can set the overall tone in trade policy. It 
would effectively be advancing the develop-
ment of global trade rules, much like the 
US and the European Union are attempting 
to do via the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP). It is preferable 
to participate in the negotiation of the new 
trade rules now, rather than having to 
accept them later as a “fait accompli”. 
Despite these benefits, the participants 
appear to be having great difficulty coming 
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to an agreement. They failed to meet an 
initial deadline for completing the nego-
tiations, first at the end of 2012, then in 
2013. US President Barack Obama’s plan to 
reach a compromise among the heads of 
state and government at the APEC meeting 
on 10-11 November 2014 was also unsuc-
cessful. As such, the remaining window of 
opportunity for a binding agreement may 
close. Positions on the key negotiating 
issues remain sharply divided. 
Some US demands are being met with 
flat-out rejections. For instance, the call to 
prohibit currency manipulation, to set out 
stringent rules on industrial property pro-
tection and to establish investor-state dis-
pute settlement proceedings. In political 
terms, Vietnam cannot realistically fulfil 
the requirement to bring about a level 
playing field for state-owned enterprises. 
Malaysia, Singapore and Japan would also 
run into difficulties if such a competition 
clause were strictly interpreted. Should the 
US get its way on these points, joining the 
TPP agreement would be out of the ques-
tion for China for the time being. 
Conversely, what the US is offering in 
terms of opening up its markets does not 
go far enough for many TPP partners. Japan, 
for example, is calling for the American 
automobile tariffs to be abolished complete-
ly, Australia wants America to open up its 
sugar market, and New Zealand is demand-
ing the liberalisation of dairy product im-
ports (in the US and Canada). Meanwhile, 
Japan is vehemently resisting a liberalisa-
tion of agricultural imports, particularly 
when it comes to the five “sacred” products: 
rice, wheat, beef and pork, dairy products 
and sugar. Although the LDP-led govern-
ment still feels bound to a corresponding 
resolution of the party’s TPP committee, 
there are visible signs of flexibility, e.g. in 
the import of pork. On the other side, the 
US farming lobby is insisting on Japan sub-
stantially opening up its agricultural mar-
ket. If such measures are not forthcoming, 
the Republican representatives from the 
farming states of the Midwest will hardly 
vote in favour of a TPP agreement. 
President Barack Obama already has a 
task on his hands to get temporary Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA) for America’s 
trade policy from Congress. TPA would 
allow the president to agree bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements that Con-
gress could subsequently only approve 
or reject as a package. Since the farming 
lobby holds great sway over the Republican 
majority, however, the chances of a TPA 
after the midterm congressional elections 
have not really improved. From the per-
spective of Japan and other TPP negotiating 
partners, there is therefore a risk that any 
agreement would be renegotiated by Con-
gress. For this reason, they will continue 
to hold back with compromises and trade 
concessions to the US. Due to the timing 
of US legislative sessions, however, if no 
compromise is reached by April 2015 at 
the latest, there will be very little chance 
of getting the TPP agreement through Con-
gress before the US presidential campaign 
gets underway. The negotiations are there-
fore most likely to be completed under 
Barack Obama’s successor. 
RCEP: trade liberalisation the 
“ASEAN Way” 
The negotiations over a Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) may 
be understood as a reaction to the TPP free 
trade initiative, but equally as an attempt 
to bring about the long-held vision of an 
Asian free trade zone. The planned RCEP 
agreement would apply to an area span-
ning the four sub-regions of South-East 
Asia, North Asia, South Asia and Oceania. 
Politically, the initiative increases the cen-
trality of the ASEAN community for Asian 
regionalism. Whereas the TPP threatens to 
split the ASEAN community (and Asia) in 
the area of trade policy, the RCEP negotia-
tions intend to demonstrate the ten ASEAN 
members’ will and capacity to bring to-
gether the countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region to promote economic integration, 
economic growth and development. The 
RCEP notably has the political backing of 
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the highly populous states of China, India 
and Indonesia – countries that cannot ful-
fil the extensive liberalisation demands of 
the TPP. 
In the RCEP negotiations ASEAN seeks 
to consolidate its existing “ASEAN+1” free 
trade agreements with Australia/New Zea-
land, China, Japan, South Korea and India 
into a “comprehensive, high quality, and 
mutually beneficial agreement establishing 
an open trade and investment environ-
ment,” as the Leaders’ Statement of the 16 
participating countries from Phnom Penh 
on 20 November 2012 explains. Liberalising 
foreign trade between the six ASEAN part-
ner countries, on the other hand, is not an 
explicit part of the negotiations. 
Japan was able to largely assert its inter-
ests over China in the run-up to the negotia-
tion process. Whereas China wanted to re-
strict the talks to the ASEAN members along 
with China, Japan and Korea (ASEAN+3), 
Japan insisted on also including India, 
Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+6), as 
it feared that China would otherwise domi-
nate the process. In terms of content, China 
was primarily interested in removing tariffs 
and liberalising trade. Japan was also look-
ing to establish binding rules on additional 
areas of negotiation. Effectively the talks 
now also cover goods trade, services, invest-
ment, competition, intellectual property 
and dispute settlement – though the goals 
are considerably less ambitious than those 
of the TPP. The partners are also discussing 
economic and technical cooperation with 
the RCEP developing countries. 
This wide-reaching agenda has not made 
the negotiations any easier, especially as 
the six ASEAN+1 agreements upon which 
they are based all vary considerably in terms 
of scope, reach and quality. Even the liber-
alisations of trade in goods are each based 
on different customs tariff lines and dif-
ferent rules of origin. Only four agreements 
included a liberalisation of services trade – 
and there was considerable variation in the 
sectors covered. With such discrepancies it 
is no wonder that no major breakthroughs 
have been made in the six negotiation 
rounds to date. It may therefore not be 
possible to meet the planned completion 
deadline at the end of 2015. 
To reach some kind of conclusion de-
spite the economic and political divergence 
within the RCEP integration area and the 
varying levels of overall ambition, the par-
ticipating states have agreed on a series 
of guiding principles. First, the envisaged 
RCEP agreement should neither replace the 
valid ASEAN+1 agreements nor reverse the 
liberalisation measures they stipulate, but 
rather create a platform for real progress. 
Second, the RCEP agreement should take 
the individual circumstances of the partici-
pating countries into account and, above 
all, ensure that the less developed econo-
mies receive special and differential treat-
ment. Third, additional ASEAN+1 partner 
states should be able to join the RCEP agree-
ment. Finally, the negotiating partners 
explicitly reaffirmed that the agreement 
should remain consistent with the WTO 
rules, in particular the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Alongside its external dimension (RCEP), 
the trade policy liberalisation of the ASEAN 
community has an internal dimension in 
the form of the planned ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). With their sights set 
once more on the end of 2015, ASEAN’s six 
old members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand – ASEAN-6) 
and four new members (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam – CLMV) aim to create a 
common market where the principle of free 
movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour will apply. However, it is foreseeable 
that the AEC – like the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) at the time – will not arrive on 
schedule. The implementation of the neces-
sary measures has stalled. Although 99 per-
cent of the customs tariffs have been re-
moved (ASEAN-6) or reduced to under 5 per-
cent (CLMV), the numerous other trade 
barriers remain intact. 
Both the RCEP and the AEC subscribe 
to the “ASEAN Way”: consensus must be 
reached when fixing goals and obligations. 
The consideration of economic interests 
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and political sensitivities favours a careful 
approach tailored to the specific situation, 
sometimes even foregoing legal enforcea-
bility. The experiences of ASEAN integra-
tion show that gradual progress can be made 
and the region is slowly becoming more 
integrated. However, it is also evident that 
rapid market liberalisation cannot be 
achieved in this manner, nor can pioneer-
ing new trade rules be enforced under 
these circumstances. 
CJK FTA – the missing piece 
of the puzzle 
Despite the considerable foreign policy 
tensions present in North-East Asia, the 
trilateral cooperation between China, Japan 
and South Korea has notably gained in 
stature and substance over recent years. In 
2010 a secretariat was set up in Seoul to 
coordinate intergovernmental cooperation 
and support joint projects, for instance in 
the areas of environment protection, disas-
ter management and cultural exchanges. In 
2012 the three countries signed a trilateral 
investment agreement. At the same time 
they resolved to enter into the long-planned 
negotiations over a trilateral free trade 
agreement (China-Japan-Korea FTA, CJK 
FTA). Six rounds of talks were held regard-
ing a liberalisation of goods trade, services 
trade, investment and intellectual property 
rights. However, the negotiations will not 
be completed by the end of 2015, as origi-
nally planned, since Japan’s ambitions are 
too far removed from those of China and 
Korea. The latter two countries fear the pre-
datory competition stemming from Japa-
nese industrial imports, while they do not 
feel that they in turn would gain export mar-
ket opportunities due to Japan’s informal, 
non-tariff trade barriers. Japan, meanwhile, 
is resisting tariff and import liberalisations 
for agricultural products and insisting on 
protection clauses against cheap Chinese 
imports. It is therefore not surprising that 
China, Japan and Korea have so far not even 
managed to agree on the scope of the tariff 
lines to be included. The fact that interest 
groups with strong political connections 
in all three countries – China’s state-owned 
companies, Japan’s farming lobby, Korea’s 
agriculture and industry – are agitating 
against a liberalisation of imports does not 
help the cause. Although China and South 
Korea did recently manage to sign a pio-
neering bilateral free trade agreement, the 
trilateral negotiations are set to drag on for 
some time, not least because liberalising 
internal North-East Asian trade is not top of 
the trade policy agenda in any of the three 
countries. 
A trilateral free trade agreement would 
nevertheless be central to the future of 
North-East Asia’s regional trade policy inte-
gration. For one thing, China, Japan and 
Korea make up 44.9 percent of the ASEAN+6 
group population, 72.1 percent of its GDP 
and 63.2 percent of its trade volume. They 
are also Asia’s most significant trading 
nations. Second, North-East Asia’s intrare-
gional foreign trade is stagnating. Although 
the absolute figures continue to rise, from 
a relative point of view the trend is one of 
disintegration, as the three countries’ trade 
with other global regions is growing more 
rapidly than their trade with one another, 
not least due to numerous bilateral free 
trade agreements with third countries. A 
trilateral CJK agreement could trigger a 
reversal of this trend. This would make CJK 
the missing piece required to complete the 
envisaged East Asian free trade zone. The 
successful completion of the investment 
agreement in 2012 showed that pragma-
tism and economic considerations can take 
the upper hand in North-East Asia and push 
geopolitical differences into the background. 
What next: TPP dominance or 
FTAAP consolidation? 
Although the prospects for the successful 
conclusion of the TPP or RCEP negotiations 
remain uncertain for the time being, a 
definitive failure of these trans-regional 
free trade initiatives is even less likely. The 
trade policy ambitions of the countries in 
the region already go beyond the TPP and 
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the RCEP. Back in 2010 the Pacific heads 
of state and government at their APEC 
meeting in Yokohama officially approved 
the trade policy initiatives TPP, ASEAN+3 
and ASEAN+6 as appropriate preliminary 
stages on the path towards a Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). At the last 
APEC meeting in Beijing in 2014 China 
proposed, not entirely unselfishly, an 
FTAAP feasibility study to pave the way for 
actual negotiations. Although this proposal 
was not taken up, due to US resistance, there 
is no question that all parties share the goal 
of free trade in the Asia-Pacific area. 
Nevertheless, there are widely held con-
cerns that Asia could be split in terms of 
trade policy, as hopes of a consolidation of 
the prospective TPP and RCEP agreements 
could prove deceptive. First, a rapproche-
ment between China and the US is extreme-
ly difficult to realise due to the geopolitical 
rivalry between the two blocs. Second, the 
competing trade policy agreements are not 
compatible with one another. It is unimag-
inable that the industrialised countries of 
the TPP, particularly the US, would be pre-
pared to make concessions on their hard-
won agreements, in areas such as competi-
tion, industrial property rights, labour and 
environmental standards. Rather than the 
TPP and the RCEP being consolidated, it 
is therefore more likely that the TPP free 
trade zone will be successively expanded. 
South Korea and Thailand have already 
signalled their interest in joining. 
In principle the TPP is open to all APEC 
member states, and if the negotiations 
reach a successful conclusion it could prove 
a very attractive prospect. On the one hand, 
it would offer privileged access to the im-
port markets of the US, Japan and Canada. 
And on the other hand, the TPP regulation 
standards could be highly attractive since 
they are necessary and useful for inter-
national business transactions. The binding 
implementation of TPP standards would 
prove the ability of emerging nations to 
connect with the industrialised world, and 
as such would be a key argument in the in-
ternational competition to attract business 
and investment. Many developing nations 
in Asia (India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar) will of course not be willing 
or able to comply with the stringent TPP 
standards for the time being. The expansion 
of the TPP area will therefore not necessari-
ly include every country in the region. The 
political resistance of China and the ASEAN 
community, fearful of losing its leading 
role in the process of East Asia’s regional 
integration, should not be underestimated 
either. The TPP nonetheless has the poten-
tial to become the decisive trade policy 
framework for Asia, provided the domestic 
policy hurdles in Washington and Tokyo 
can be overcome. Should this succeed, the 
TPP will probably fill the institutional 
vacuum of Asia’s soft regionalism. The com-
prehensive, binding regulations on the 
movement of goods, services and capital 
envisaged under the TPP would be funda-
mental for trade in the region. The TPP 
could also become the crucial blueprint 
for regulatory policy on a global level, as a 
further development of trade rules in a 
multilateral (WTO) or trans-Atlantic (TTIP) 
context only appears likely to happen in 
the even more distant future if at all.  
What about Europe? 
Europe is not participating in any of the 
Asia-Pacific free trade projects. Further-
more, it is taking a noticeably passive stance 
on the region’s efforts to reshape the trade 
and regulatory policies of the world trade 
order. Europe would be negatively im-
pacted by all the prospective agreements 
(TPP, RCEP, CJK-FTA), with simulations 
indicating that trade with Japan would 
suffer the most from trade deflection. 
The EU would be spared such effects 
if it signed its own free trade agreements 
with Asian and Pacific trade partners, as it 
has already done with Chile, Mexico, Peru, 
Singapore, South Korea and most recently 
Canada (CETA, not yet ratified). The EU 
has also been conducting talks with India 
(since 2007), Malaysia (since 2010), Viet-
nam (since 2012), Japan (since 2013) and 
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above all with the US (since 2013). The 
agreement with the US, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
is very important in terms of regulatory 
policy. In consultation with the US, the 
EU has the opportunity to impose its own 
regulatory ideas for global trade and to 
actively participate in designing the future 
world trade order. There is no doubt that 
the TTIP is a key strategic development that 
will directly impact third countries as well. 
In trade policy with Asia, however, the EU 
lacks any clear definition, despite its weight 
as the world’s largest trading power, and 
is thus missing out on the chance to set its 
own strategic priorities. 
The secular opportunity to break down 
Japan’s non-tariff trade obstacles and struc-
tural market barriers cannot be taken on 
single-handedly. While Japan is deftly play-
ing its trading partners off against one 
another in four different mega-deals, the 
EU and the US are making no efforts to 
counter Japan’s protectionist interest 
groups through joint, concerted pressure. 
A successful conclusion of the negotia-
tions with Singapore, Malaysia and Viet-
nam should be taken as a starting signal for 
a new attempt to negotiate with the ASEAN 
community, the EU’s natural partner in 
Asia and the anchor of Asian regionalism. 
Myanmar, which is opening up politically, 
must not be seen as an obstacle to agree-
ment on trade policy. 
A trade policy that blanks out China to 
create an “Asia minus one” community 
is not sustainable. Pushing for China’s iso-
lation in trade policy via trans-regional 
mega-projects is something the West should 
avoid altogether. From Europe’s point of 
view, it would be beneficial to enter into 
negotiations over a free trade agreement 
with China before it applies to join the TPP. 
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